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FROM PENN CENTRAL TO UNITED ARTISTS' I & II: 
THE RISE TO IMMUNITY OF HISTORIC 
PRESERVATION DESIGNATION FROM SUCCESSFUL 
TAKINGS CHALLENGES 
Daniel T. Cavarello* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The historic preservation movement has an extensive history stretch-
ing from eighteenth century Europe to the present day. That history 
includes both the efforts of many private individuals as well as those 
of local and national governments. In the United States, the preser-
vation movement was initially fueled by private individuals wishing 
to instill a sense of patriotism and further the idea of a national 
community in the mid-nineteenth century. By the early- to mid-twen-
tieth century, public entities had begun to fuel the preservation move-
ment with local, state, and even the federal government furthering 
these patriotic preservation objectives through the passage of legis-
lation designed to protect formally designated historic landmarks. 
Thus, by the 1960s, the preservation of American historical sites had 
become a primary concern of both private citizens, as well as legisla-
tive bodies. 
Most recently, however, the American historic preservation move-
ment has received its strongest and most significant endorsement, 
that of the judiciary. Specifically, the United States Supreme Court, 
in its 1978 decision in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New 
York, l conclusively established that state and local governments may 
enact regulations which further the goals of historic preservation. 
Over the past fifteen years, the effect of this decision has been to 
* Staff writer, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 1993-1994. 
'438 u.s. 104, 123-28 (1978). 
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prevent private individuals who own historically designated proper-
ties from successfully challenging the designations as takings under 
the federal Constitution or the applicable state constitution. In this 
way, historic designations in the United States have become immune 
from constitutional takings challenges. This constitutional immunity 
is the subject of this Comment. 
Section II of this Comment traces the historical development of the 
preservation movement from its early days in Western Europe to its 
spread to the United States and development there in the nineteenth 
century. Section III discusses the modern development of historic 
preservation laws in the United States through both legislation and 
ground-breaking Supreme Court decisions in the twentieth century. 
Section IV provides an overview of the United States Supreme Court's 
opinion in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, the 
strongest endorsement of historic preservation legislation to date. 
Section V discusses the one and only challenge to the Penn Central 
doctrine, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's 1991 decision in United 
Artists' Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia. Section VI 
discusses the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's reversal of its decision 
within just two years in United Artists' Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City 
of Philadelphia II. Finally, Section VII analyzes the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court's sudden reversal of opinion in the second United 
Artists'decision and argues that such reversal demonstrates the propo-
sition that historic preservation laws have become immune from con-
stitutional takings challenges. 
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 
A. Europe 
In order to adequately trace the development of the historic pres-
ervation movement, a brief look at the European experience is nec-
essary. Prior to the late eighteenth century, historic preservation did 
not exist in any structured form. Rather, it was an activity carried out 
by select individuals for any number of reasons, including aesthetics 
or tradition.2 It was not until after the French Revolution that the 
movement in Europe officially began in France and subsequently 
spread to England. 
2 See G. BALDWIN BROWN, THE CARE OF ANCIENT MONUMENTS 12-13 (1905) (providing a 
history of early historic preservation). 
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In 1794, the revolutionary government in France proposed a re-
sponse in opposition to a forthcoming policy of destroying all traces 
of Latin inscriptions on French monuments.3 That response was an 
effort to save works of art from the iconoclasm of the French Revo-
lution.4 The response was led by Henri Gregoire, known as the Abbe 
Gregoire, a member of the French revolutionary government who 
subsequently produced several reports arguing for the preservation 
of ancient monuments.5 These reports are regarded as the first formal 
statements in favor of preservation and remain the basis for public 
policy in this area today.6 
In 1830, the head of the French government, King Louis Phillippe, 
took a formalized interest in several French historic sites and created 
an office known as the Inspector of Historic Monuments.7 This office 
included a commission which was responsible for an inventory of older 
buildings in France.8 The inventory was ultimately used as a means of 
protecting these older buildings from both alteration and destruction.9 
In contrast to the French experience, the British preservation move-
ment did not begin to take shape until the mid-to-Iate nineteenth 
century when private organizations took the initiative to preserve old 
buildings. The British movement was led by two preservationists, 
John Ruskin and William Morris.lO The ideas of these two Englishmen 
focused primarily on the premise that preservation should prevail 
over restoration since the latter "changed" the structure, and there-
fore the mystique, of the original building.ll 
The most significant development in the early British preserva-
tion movement, however, came in the public, not private, sphere of 
British society. In February, 1873, a bill was introduced in the House 
of Commons by Sir John Lubbock, a member of the House, entitled, 
"A Bill to Provide for the Preservation of Ancient National Monu-
ments."12 The objective of this bill was to establish a commission with 
3 Joseph L. Sax, Heritage Preservation as a Public Duty: The Abbe Gregoire and the Origins 
of an Idea, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1142, 1143 (1990). 
4 Joseph L. Sax, Is Anyone Minding Stonehenge? The Origins of Cultural Property in 
England, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1543, 1544 (1990). 
5 Sax, supra note 3, at 1143-44. 
6 See id. at 1144. 
7 CHARLES B. HOSMER, JR., PRESENCE OF THE PAST 23 (1966). 
8Id. 
9Id. 
10 Id. at 24. 
11 See id. In 1877, an organization known as the Society for the Protection of Ancient Buildings 
was founded by the followers of Ruskin. Id. 
12 BROWN, supra note 2, at 152-54. 
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the authority to designate specific structures as ancient monuments 
which in turn meant that any private owner was obligated to notify 
the commission prior to any modification of the site.I3 After notifica-
tion, the government could either purchase the structure, or let the 
owner proceed.I4 
The significance of this bill was that it was the first time in the 
Anglo-American world that a legal rationale was advanced in favor of 
historic preservation.I5 The rationale consisted of both the protection 
of cultural property as a governmental duty, and the concept that 
public ownership should be forced on private owners who are unwill-
ing to participate.I6 In light of England's strong belief in the private 
property system during the mid-to-Iate nineteenth century, the bill, 
not surprisingly, faced considerable opposition and was ultimately 
defeated.I7 Despite this defeat, however, Sir John Lubbock's rationale, 
as exhibited in the following quotation from one debate on the Monu-
ments Bill, still survives today. In that debate, Lubbock noted: 
It is again no question of expediency or feeling whether we shall 
preserve the buildings of past times or not. We have no right 
whatever to touch them. They are not ours .... The dead still 
have their right in them: that which they labored for ... we have 
no right to obliterate ... still less is the right to the use of what 
they have left vested in us only. It belongs to all their successors.I8 
At the very least, Lubbock's and Ruskin's beliefs about the impor-
tance and necessity of preserving ancient monuments carried over to 
the United States where a preservation movement of its own had 
already begun. 
B. United States 
The mid-nineteenth century development of the historic preserva-
tion movement in the United States resulted from both a keen inter-
est in civic education as well as the realization that a common past 
would further the idea of a national community.I9 Thus, the movement 
13 Sax, supra note 4, at 1547. 
14 [d. 
16 [d. at 1549. 
16 [d. 
17 For a detailed discussion of the opposition to the Bill and Lubbock's defense of the Bill, see 
id. at 1549-54. 
18 [d. at 1547 (quoting JOHN RUSKIN, THE SEVEN LAMPS OF ARCHITECTURE (Everyman's 
ed., 1956». 
19 See Carol M. Rose, Preservation and Community: New Directions in the Law of Historic 
Preservation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 473, 481-82 (1981). 
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did not merely grow out of an appreciation for aesthetics as some may 
believe today.20 Rather, early preservationist efforts focused on inspir-
ing a sense of patriotism in people when they viewed old buildings or 
pieces of land which at one time were occupied by famous historical 
figures.21 
As was the case in England, private individuals were the driving 
force of the early American preservation movement.22 These individu-
als saw themselves as responsible for protecting those historically 
significant buildings which had not yet been destroyed.23 In the early 
stages, and despite efforts by private individuals, state and local 
governments did little or nothing to support preservation efforts.24 
The federal government limited its activity in this area to the pres-
ervation of Civil War battlefields.25 
Nevertheless, what is widely considered the first preservation ac-
tivity in the United States-the effort to prevent the destruction of 
Independence Hall in 1816-was actually a combined effort of private 
individuals and state government.26 In that effort, the state govern-
ment of Pennsylvania had proposed a sale of what was then known as 
the Old State House in Philadelphia since it had determined that the 
government no longer had any use for the building.27 Opposed to this 
sale, a group of Philadelphia citizens addressed the state legislature 
in a "Memorial" which contained reasons why the building should not 
be destroyed.2B After initially winning a stay of execution, temporarily 
saving the Old State House from destruction, the citizens persuaded 
the city of Philadelphia to purchase both the Hall and the square from 
the state for $70,000.29 The city subsequently provided renovations 
and in time, the Old State House was transformed into Independence 
Hall.30 
20 See Christopher J. Duerksen & David Bonderman, Preservation Law: Where It's Been, 
Where It's Going, in A HANDBOOK ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW 1 (C. Duerksen ed., 1983); 
Rose, surrra note 19, at 481--84. 
21 Rose, supa note 19, at 479-80. 
22 See Alan C. Weinstein, The Myth of Ministry v. Mortar: A Legal and Policy Analysis of 
Landmark Designation of Religious Institutions, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 91, 96 (1992). 
23 Id. By this time, many historic structures had been destroyed through natural calamities, 
metropolitan growth, and simple changing of tastes. Id. at 96 n.26. 
24 See id. at 29-62 (describing limited state and local preservation efforts). 
25 Duerksen & Bonderman, supa note 20, at 2. 
26 HOSMER, supa note 7, at 29-30. 
27 See NATHAN WEINBERG, PRESERVATION IN AMERICAN ToWNS AND CITIES 20 (1979). 
28 See HOSMER, supa note 7, at 30-31, for a full account of the debate to preserve Inde-
pendence Hall. 
29 Id. at 30. 
3Q See WEINBERG, surrra note 27, at 20. 
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The next major American preservation effort did not take place 
until the 1850s when the struggle to save Mount Vernon occurred.31 
In the Mount Vernon case, appeals were made to both the state and 
federal governments to purchase the mansion and grounds, but both 
levels of government refused due to the exorbitant $200,000 price 
being sought by its owner, John Washington.32 Over time, the physical 
condition of Mount Vernon rapidly deteriorated and the likelihood 
that it would ultimately be sold to private investors was increasing.33 
Soon thereafter, however, a woman by the name of Ann Pamela 
Cunningham organized the Mount Vernon Ladies Association, which 
was chartered by the State of Virginia, to help save the mansion and 
grounds.34 This group, widely considered to be the first nationwide 
organization dedicated to preservation, came about after a famous 
open letter Cunningham had written to the "Ladies of the South."35 
After just six years, the Association purchased the mansion and grounds 
of Mount Vernon in 1858.36 
The efforts of the Association and Cunningham became the model 
for future organizations wishing to preserve other historic sites.37 The 
patriotic spirit created by this movement, along with the impetus of 
the Civil War, created an uncontrollable atmosphere for preservation 
in the late nineteenth century which ultimately spurred the federal 
government into a larger role. 
The federal government was a party to the first preservation-
related litigation in the United States. This litigation involved the 
congressional condemnation of private property for the purpose of 
establishing a national memorial at the Gettysburgh battlefield site. 
In United States v. Gettysburgh Electric Railway CO.,38 the United 
States Supreme Court concluded that the preservation of a historic 
monument served a legitimate public purpose and thus was within the 
federal government's condemnation power.39 The Court noted in sup-
port of its conclusion that: 
The battle of Gettysburgh was one of the great battles of the 
world .... The existence of the government itself ... depended 
31J. MORRISON, HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW 2-3 (1965). 
32 See Duerksen & Bonderman, supra note 20, at 1. 
33 Id. 
34 See HOSMER, supra note 7, at 42. 
35 Id. at 44. 
36 Id. at 49. 
37 See Duerksen & Bonderman, supra note 20, at 2. 
38 160 U.S. 668 (1896). 
39Id. at 681-86. 
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on the result .... Such a use seems necessarily not only a public 
use, but one so closely connected with the welfare of the republic 
itself as to be within the powers granted Congress by the Consti-
tution for the purpose of protecting and preserving the whole 
country.40 
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The primary significance of this decision is that the Supreme Court, 
for the first time, recognized that historic preservation was an activity 
within the powers of the federal government.41 
During the early 1900s, local and state governments joined the his-
toric preservation movement. These entities used their police power 
to amend zoning laws for the purpose of protecting buildings, dis-
tricts, and landmarks.42 The cities involved in this first "local phase" 
included Charleston, New Orleans, and San Antonio.43 In the period 
from 1930 to 1960, similar ordinances were promulgated in many more 
cities throughout the country.44 The common feature of all of these 
ordinances was that the vast majority of them protected from de-
struction entire neighborhoods or districts and not merely individual 
buildings.45 
Thus, by the early- to mid-twentieth century, historic preservation 
had strong, local legislative support in the form of city ordinances. 
Not surprisingly, this legislation, along with subsequent federal leg-
islation, ultimately led to a great deal of litigation. The next section 
will examine the most influential of this litigation. 
III. MODERN DEVELOPMENT OF HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAWS 
A. Supreme Court Jurisprudence 
The major impetus for the tremendous development of historic 
preservation laws in the United States was the Supreme Court's 
decision in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty CO.46 Euclid involved 
a challenge to a zoning ordinance adopted by the Cleveland, Ohio 
suburb of Euclid, which precluded Ambler Realty Co. from using its 
40 [d. at 681--82. 
41 David B. Fein, Note, Historic Districts: Preserving City Neighborhoods For The Privileged, 
60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 64, 72-73 (1985). 
42 See id. at 73. 
43 [d.; see MORRISON, supra note 31, at 129--86 (listing and describing all local ordinances 
enacted prior to 1965). The Charleston ordinance was passed in 1931; the New Orleans ordinance 
in 1937; and the San Antonio ordinance in 1939. Duerksen & Bonderman, supra note 20, at 6. 
44 Duerksen & Bonderman, supra note 20, at 5--8. 
45 See Fein, supra note 41, at 74. 
46 272 U.S. 365 (1928). 
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property for commercial development and, as a result, significantly 
lowered its value. Ambler Realty argued the ordinance amounted to 
an unconstitutional taking of private property under the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.47 The Court held that such an ordinance 
was not an unconstitutional taking, reasoning that its use restrictions 
were sufficiently related to the public welfare.48 The Court noted 
"[t]he ordinance now under review, and all similar laws and regula-
tions, must find their justification in some aspect of the police power, 
asserted for the public welfare .... [If] the validity of the legislative 
classification ... be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be 
allowed to control."49 This decision by the Supreme Court effectively 
validated zoning restrictions, provided they were reasonable and served 
the public welfare. 50 
The Supreme Court extended the "public welfare" rationale for 
historic preservation zoning restrictions to include land-use controls 
based on aesthetic considerations in the 1954 decision of Berman v. 
Parker.51 This decision, though not dealing directly with the constitu-
tionality of historic preservation laws, triggered the most active pe-
riod for local governments in this area.52 
Berman dealt with the question of whether Congress had the power 
to condemn a particular area of Washington, D.C. in favor of an urban 
renewal project for the sole purpose of improving the aesthetics of 
the neighborhood.53 The Court held that the revitalization of urban 
areas and the provision of a beautiful place for residents to live were 
within the definition of "public welfare."54 The Court emphasized the 
significance of aesthetic objectives as an important aspect of the pub-
lic welfare that states could promote pursuant to their police powers.55 
The Court stated: 
47Id. at 384-85. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution reads, in relevant 
part: "No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. 
amend. V. Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution reads, in 
relevant part: "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law." U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1. 
48 Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395. 
49Id. at 387-88 (emphasis added). 
50 See Duerksen & Bonderman, supra note 20, at 5. But see Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 
U.S. 393, 415 (1922) ("The general rule is ... that while property may be regulated to a certain 
extent, if regulation goes too far, it will be recognized as a taking."). 
51 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
52 See Fein, supra note 41, at 74. 
63 348 U.S. at 28-31. 
54 Id. at 33. 
55 Id. at 32. 
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The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive .... The 
values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as 
well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to 
determine that the community should be beautiful as well as 
healthy, spacious as well as clean. . . . If those who govern the 
District of Columbia decide that the nation's Capital should be 
beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amend-
ment that stands in the way. 56 
601 
The Court's ringing endorsement of the legitimacy of aesthetic 
objectives in Berman gave any state desiring to pass or justify a 
historic preservation law the necessary justification: such laws fall 
clearly within a state's police power. 57 Not surprisingly, this endorse-
ment proved to be the turning point for the American preservation 
movement as a growing number of localities began to adopt more 
preservation ordinances than ever before.58 
B. Significant Historic Preservation Legislation Following 
Berman v. Parker 
In 1965, New York City became the first major American city to 
enact a comprehensive landmark and historic district plan.59 New York 
City's Landmarks Preservation Law ("Landmarks Law"), passed pur-
suant to a state enabling statute,60 has the enunciated purpose of 
"preserving cities and districts special to the city's cultural, social, 
economical, political and architectural history."61 The Act functions by 
way of a Landmarks Preservation Commission consisting of eleven 
commissioners62 who have the power, within set guidelines, to desig-
nate structures or districts as landmarks.58 Once a designation has 
occurred,64 a property owner may not destroy, alter, or even restore 
the structure without the permission of the Landmarks Commis-
56 Id. at 33. 
67 See Albert H. Manwaring, Note, American Heritage at Stake: The Government's Vital 
Interest in Interior Landmark Designations, 25 NEW ENG. L. REV. 291, 315 (1990). 
58 See Duerksen & Bonderman, supra note 20, at 7. 
59 See Fein, supra note 41, at 74-75; NEW YORK, N.Y. CHARTER & ADMIN. CODE ANN. vol. 
2, ch. 8-A §§ 2.05-1.0, 2.07-1.0 to 21 (Williams 1976 & Supp. 1984). 
60 Historic Preservation Enabling Act of 1965, N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 96-a (McKinney 1977) 
(empowering the state's municipalities to protect and preserve buildings and places of "historical 
or aesthetic interest or value"). 
61 NEW YORK, N.Y. CHARTER & ADMIN. CODE ANN. vol. 2, ch. 8-A, § 2.05-1.0(b) (Williams 
1976 & Supp. 1984). 
62 NEW YORK, N.Y. CODE § 534(2)(a) (1985). 
63 Id. at § 534. 
64 Ordinary maintenance is permissible. NEW YORK CITY, NEW YORK ADMIN. CODE § 25-302R 
(1985). 
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sion.65 Finally, the Landmarks Law also provides for interested or 
affected parties to comment on designation proposals with procedures 
for modification, disapproval, or recision of designation orders.66 
Congress followed New York City's lead in 1966 when it passed the 
National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 (NHPA). The NHPA re-
mains the basic federal preservation statute today.67 Earlier congres-
sional attempts at preservation, such as the Historic Sites, Buildings 
and Antiquities Act of 193568 and the National Trust for Historic 
Preservation in 1949,69 had failed. On the whole, the NHPA, with its 
subsequent amendments, has been successful in achieving national 
preservation goals.70 
In short, the NHPA is the principal legislative authority for any or 
all federal historic preservation programs.71 The Act contains four 
major provisions: 1) the National Register of Historic Places;72 2) a 
matching fund for states willing to carry out the purposes of the Act;73 
3) the Advisory Council to the President and Congress on historic 
preservation;74 and 4) the section 106 duty imposed on federal agen-
cies to seek the Advisory Council's comments on any actions taken on 
affected properties or those properties eligible for the National Reg-
ister of Historic Places.75 These four provisions make up the core of 
the NHPA. 
Not surprisingly, the enactment of more state and local preserva-
tion ordinances followed the enactment of the NHPA. Over the past 
half-century or so, all fifty states have adopted some form of legisla-
65 Id. at § 25-305. 
66 Id. at § 25-308. 
67 National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-665, § 1,80 Stat. 95 (codified as 
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 470-470x-6 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)). 
68 16 U.S.C. §§ 461-467 (1982). 
69 16 U.S.C. § 468 (1982). 
70 See generally, ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION, TwENTY YEARS OF THE 
NATIONAL HISTORIC PRESERVATION ACT (1986). 
71 See Duerksen & Bonderman, supra note 20, at 210-46. 
72 16 U.S.C. § 470a(a) (1988). The National Register of Historic Places is an official listing of 
the nation's properties and resources that are significant in American history, architecture, and 
culture.ld. 
73 Id. § 470a(d). The National Historic Preservation Fund encourages the development of state 
historic preservation programs by providing 50% matching grants to those who wish to partici-
pate in such programs by following federal standards and criteria. Id. 
74 16 U.S.C. §§ 470i-470j (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). The Advisory Council on Historic Preser-
vation is an independent federal agency which advises the President, Congress, and other 
federal agencies on preservation issues. Id. 
75Id. § 470f (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Section 106 "review" requires the head of a federal agency 
to notify the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation before taking any action that would 
affect a property listed or eligible for listing on the National Register of Historic Places. Id. 
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tion for the purpose of historical preservation.76 Nevertheless, despite 
the adoption of these ordinances, and despite previous holdings by the 
Supreme Court regarding the "public welfare" justification, the issue 
of the validity of governmental action solely to protect historic places 
had still not been tested in court by the mid-1970s.77 However, as of 
1978, the validity of historic preservation ordinances was no longer in 
doubt after the Supreme Court's decision in Penn Central Transpor-
tation Co. v. City of New York. 78 
IV. PENN CENTRAL TRANSPORTATION CO. V. CITY OF NEW YORK: 
AN OVERVIEW 
In Penn Central, the United States Supreme Court affirmatively 
established historic preservation as a legitimate public purpose within 
the scope of the government's police power.79 Specifically, the Court 
held that the New York City Landmarks Law's80 restrictions on indi-
vidual buildings and historic districts did not amount to a taking of 
the property on which Grand Central Station was situated.8! In up-
holding the New York City Landmarks Commission's designation of 
the Grand Central Terminal as a landmark, the Court explicitly dis-
missed the idea that aesthetic considerations alone are not a proper 
basis for the use of the government's police power. The Court noted that 
states and cities may enact land use restrictions to enhance the qual-
ity of life of its citizens by preserving the aesthetic features of a city.82 
A. Background of the Penn Central Decision 
In September, 1967, the New York City Landmarks Preservation 
Commission designated the Grand Central Terminal as a landmark.83 
In 1968, Penn Central leased the air rights above the Terminal to UGP 
Properties, Inc., a private developer, for the purpose of constructing 
a high-rise office building on the top of the building.84 As required by 
76 See Manwaring, supra note 57, at 299. 
77 See Duerksen & Bonderman, supra note 20, at 4. 
78 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
79Id. at 123-38. 
80 See supra notes 59--66 and accompanying text. 
8! Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 131, 138. 
82 Id. at 123-29. 
83 Norman Marcus, The Grand Central Terminal Decision: A Euclid for Landmarks, Favor-
able Notice for TDR and a Resolution of the Regulatory/Takings Impasse, in HISTORIC PRES-
ERVATION LAW 173, 176 (Nicholas A. Robinson ed., 1979). 
84 See Duerksen & Bonderman, supra note 20, at 14. This building would not have violated 
applicable zoning laws. Marcus, supra note 83, at 176. 
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the Landmarks Law, Penn Central and UGP applied for permission 
to proceed with the planned alterations of the Terminal, submitting 
two separate proposals to the Commission.85 The Commission, how-
ever, flatly rejected both proposals, terming the entire idea of altering 
the terminal in the proposed wayan "aesthetic joke."86 Rather than 
appeal the Commission's decision, Penn Central and UGP chose to file 
for an injunction barring the city from using the Landmarks Law to 
prohibit the proposed addition to the terminal in a lower New York 
trial COurt.87 
In support of their argument for declaratory and injunctive relief, 
Penn Central and UGP argued that the denial by the Commission of 
a permit to alter the Terminal amounted to an unconstitutional taking 
since it effectively precluded the two companies from using their 
property for profit.88 The trial judge, persuaded by this argument, 
granted the plaintiffs declaratory and injunctive relief against the 
city.89 Specifically, the court found that the petitioners had demon-
strated the requisite economic damage for the landmark restriction 
to amount to an unconstitutional taking of their property.90 
On appeal by the city, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate 
Division, reversed.91 In contrast to the lower court's findings, the 
Appellate Division concluded that Penn Central and UGP had failed 
to show that the landmark restrictions deprived them of all "reason-
able use" of their property, and, thus, had not shown a "taking."92 
According to the appellate court, the fact that the respondents con-
tinued to operate a profitable train station on the site demanded this 
result under the "reasonable use" standard.93 The Appellate Division's 
decision was later unanimously upheld by the New York Court of 
Appeals.94 
85 Marcus, supra note 83, at 179. 
86 New York Landmarks Preservation Comm'n Dec. Nos. LPC 69005, 69006, 10 (1967). 
87 Marcus, supra note 83, at 179. 
88 Duerksen & Bonderman, supra note 20, at 15. For specific figures put forth by Penn Central 
and UGP, see id. 
89 Marcus, supra note 83, at 181. The lower court decision is unreported. 
90 Duerksen & Bonderman, supra note 20, at 15-16. 
91 Pennsylvania Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 377 N.Y.S.2d 20, 22, 42 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975), 
aff'd, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914 (N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). Duerksen & Bonderman, supra 
note 20, at 16. 
92 Pennsylvania 'Pransp. Co., 377 N.Y.S.2d at 36. 
93 [d. 
94 Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914, 916 (N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 438 
U.S. 104 (1978). 
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B. United States Supreme Court Decisions 
Following their defeat at both the Appellate Division and at the 
Court of Appeals, Penn Central and UGP sought review by the United 
States Supreme Court. Once again, however, the petitioners were 
unsuccessful. In a major victory for preservationists nationwide, a 
six-justice majority of the Court upheld the restrictions imposed by 
the New York City Landmarks Commission.95 In its decision, the 
Court dismissed what amounted to essentially the same arguments 
that the petitioners had attempted unsuccessfully in the New York 
courts.96 In short, the Court found that the Landmarks Law was an 
appropriate means of accomplishing the legitimate police power ob-
jective of preserving the city's aesthetic features.97 
The Penn Central Court formulated a three-part balancing test for 
evaluating takings challenges.98 The three factors to be considered 
are: 1) the economic impact of the law on the claimant; 2) the extent 
to which the law has interfered with distinct investment-backed ex-
pectations; and 3) the character of the governmental action.99 Accord-
ing to the Court, the economic impact on the property is that portion 
of the original whose value has been destroyed as a result of the 
applicability of the regulation. lOO The second factor, interference with 
investment-backed expectations, deals primarily with whether the 
law still permits the property owner to make reasonable use of his or 
her property.lOl Finally, under the Court's analysis, the character of 
the governmental action prong focuses on the justification for the 
law.102 Under this factor, laws designed to produce a broad public 
benefit are likely to be upheld as constitutional.103 
95 Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123-38 (1978). 
96 The petitioners' constitutional challenge was based on three specific claims: the ordinance 
(1) "took" the "air rights" above the terminal without just compensation; (2) differed from 
historic district ordinances in that the ordinance singled out certain property owners for unfair 
treatment and thereby significantly diminished the value of individual properties with no 
comparable benefit to the property owners; and (3) amounted to a governmental appropriation 
of a section of the petitioners' property for a public use. See id. at 130-35. The Court system-
atically rejected all three of these arguments. See id. 
97Id. at 129. 
98 For a detailed analysis of these factors, see Jan G. Laitos, The Takings Clause in America's 
Industrial States After Lucas, 24 U. TOL. L. REV. 281, 291-94 (1993). 
99 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. 
100 See Laitos, supra note 98, at 295. 
101 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124; see Laitos, supra note 98, at 295--96. 
102 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124; see Laitos, supra note 98, at 296. 
!O3 See Laitos, supra note 98, at 296. 
606 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 22:593 
In applying the three factors to the facts' of Penn Central, the Court 
found that the balance weighed heavily in favor of the Landmarks 
Law.104 The Court reasoned that the petitioners' original property had 
not been destroyed in any way, that a reasonable use for the property 
still existed-namely, the present one-and that the government ac-
tion was clearly for the benefit of the public-at-Iarge in preserving the 
historical and aesthetic value of the Grand Central Terminal.105 Al-
though the Penn Central decision may not have affirmatively settled 
every potential preservation issue,l06 it clearly did resolve the most 
important issue for preservationists: a state may constitutionally pro-
mote historical preservation goals pursuant to a valid exercise of its 
police powers because such goals undoubtedly benefit the public wel-
fare.107 
C. The Impact of Lucas on the Penn Central Takings Analysis 
In 1992, the Supreme Court made its most recent statement on the 
takings issue in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.108 Though 
not dealing with historic preservation in any way, Lucas seems to 
have expanded or at least clarified the three-part balancing test enun-
ciated in Penn Central. 
In Lucas, the petitioner had purchased two residential beachfront 
lots on a barrier island near Charleston, South Carolina.108 'I\vo years 
later, the state legislature amended its Beachfront Management Act 
to prohibit certain beachfront property owners, with lots similarly 
situated to those of the petitioner, from building permanent struc-
tures on their lots.llo The state court in South Carolina awarded the 
petitioner $1.2 million in damages after the petitioner successfully 
argued that the amended Act made his property worthless.lll How-
ever, the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed, stating that the 
regulation was legitimately designed to prevent harmful uses of prop-
erty which may become public nuisances.1l2 
104 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 128--35. 
105 See id. at 131. 
106 Presumably, historic designations could still be challenged on other constitutional grounds 
such as due process, equal protection, or under the First Amendment. 
107 See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 123-38. 
108 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992). 
109 [d. at 2889. 
110 [d. 
111 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 896 (S.C. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct 
2886 (1992). 
112 [d. at 901-{)2. The Supreme Court did not deal with the question of whether or not the land 
was worthless. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2893, 2895 (1992). 
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On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed the state 
supreme court, holding that regulations which deny all economically 
viable uses of property constitute a taking requiring just compensa-
tion, regardless of the public interest advanced.ll3 Applied to the 
historic preservation context, the three-part analysis from Penn Cen-
tral would no longer be applicable in those cases where a preservation 
ordinance renders a particular piece of property or structure value-
less.114 
Although the Lucas rationale has not yet been applied to a histori-
cal preservation situation, it would probably affect only those cases 
in which a property owner was able to demonstrate that his or her 
property is worthless due to the regulation. At the very least, then, 
the Penn Central rationale remains the standard for the vast majority 
of historic preservation takings challenges. 
V. STATE CHALLENGE TO PENN CENTRAL: UNITED ARTISTS' 
THEATER CIRCUIT, INC. V. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA (1991) 
Until July of 1991, the Penn Central rationale remained essentially 
unchallenged by any state or federal court decision. However, in a 
case substantially similar to the facts of Penn Central, the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court held that sections of Philadelphia's Historic 
Preservation Act unconstitutionally deprived property owners of an 
ownership interest in their property without just compensation in 
violation of Article I, Section 10 of the Pennsylvania ConstitutionY5 
In United Artists', the then owner of the Boyd Theater in Phila-
delphia, Sameric Corporation, was notified by the Philadelphia His-
toric Commission ("the Commission") in 1986 that it was going to 
consider a proposed designation of the theater as "historic" at a pub-
lic meetingY6 Acting pursuant to a city ordinance,117 the Commis-
113 Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2895. 
114 See id. 
115 United Artists' Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 595 A.2d 6, 13-14 (Pa. 1991), 
rev'd, 635 A.2d 612 (Pa. 1993); Article I, Section 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution reads, in 
relevant part: "Nor shall private property be taken or applied to public use, without authority 
of law and without just compensation being first made or secured." P A. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
116 United Artists', 595 A.2d at 7. Prior to the decision by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
in United Artists', the Boyd Theater was sold by the Sameric Corporation to United Artists' 
Theater Circuit, Inc. The later remains the current owner of the theater as of the date of this 
writing. 
117 PHILADELPHIA, PA. CODE § 14-2007, relating to historic buildings, structures and other 
items of historical significance, lists the following purposes, in relevant part: 
(1) preserve buildings, structures, sites and objects which are important to the 
education, culture, traditions and economic values of the city .... 
(3) encourage the restoration and rehabilitation of buildings, structures, sites and 
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sion,118 after numerous public hearings and attempts by the Sameric 
Corporation to prevent the designation, voted to designate the Boyd 
Theater as a historic building.119 
The designation of the theater as a historic building placed numer-
ous restrictions on the owner's use of the property.120 First, any appli-
cation by the property owner for a permit to alter or demolish the 
building would involve forwarding it to the Commission for its re-
view.121 Secondly, the Commission had the power to force the property 
owner to conduct an evaluation, ifit deemed one necessary, of whether 
or not the structure might have alternative uses "consistent with its 
preservation."l22 Finally, under the Historic Preservation Act, the 
owner incurred an obligation to maintain the structure in good repair, 
which would include both the exterior and interior, at his or her own 
expense and would be subject to a substantial fine or imprisonment 
if the obligation was breached.l23 
Following the designation, the Sameric Corporation sought both a 
preliminary injunction to eliminate the restrictions on the property 
as well as a declaratory judgment stating that the Commission's ac-
tions were beyond the scope of its power.l24 A dismissal of the suit 
by a Pennsylvania trial court was affirmed by the Commonwealth 
Court.125 Subsequently, however, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
granted an appeaP26 to determine whether the property owner's claim 
of ultra vires action by the Commission was valid.127 
[d. 
objects which are designated as historic or which are located within and contribute to 
the character of districts designated as historic .... 
(4) afford the City, interested persons, historical societies and organizations the 
opportunity to acquire or to arrange for the preservation of historic buildings .... 
(6) foster civic pride in the architectural, historical, cultural and educational accom-
plishments of Philadelphia. 
118 PHILADELPHIA, PA. CODE § 14-2007(4)(a), provides that the mayor shall appoint a Histori-
cal Commission with the power to "[d]esignate as historic those buildings, structures, sites and 
objects which the Commission determines, pursuant to the criteria set forth ... are significant 
to the City." [d. 
119 United Artists', 595 A.2d at 7-K 
120 [d. at 11. 
121 [d. at 10. 
122 [d. 
123 [d. at 11 n.7. 
124 [d. at 8. 
125 [d. 
126 Sameric Corp. of Chestnut St., Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 558 A.2d 155 (Pa. 1989), appeal 
granted, 575 A.2d 119 (Pa. 1990), order rev'd, 595 A.2d 6 (Pa. 1991). 
127 United Artists', 595 A.2d at 7. 
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The primary focus of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's opinion, 
written by Justice Larsen, was the level of intrusiveness of the Phila-
delphia ordinance on the property owner's rights. The most striking 
example of the severity of the intrusiveness, the court noted, came 
from the testimony at a hearing by the counsel for the property 
owner.l28 The court stated: 
At a hearing on April 2, 1987, counsel for the owner stated that 
he was informed that in Philadelphia the only changes or improve-
ments a property owner can lawfully do without a permit is paint 
and paper. Thus, after historic designation, any work other than 
painting and paper would require the Commission's approval ... 
the owner would be legally obligated to obtain permission from 
the commission to move a mirror from one wall to another. Noone 
on the Commission disputed counsel's observation.129 
As a result of this high level of intrusiveness, the court held that 
regulations, like the one at issue, which impose public burdens on an 
individual property owner and not on neighboring property owners, 
amount to a taking of private property in violation of the Pennsylva-
nia Constitution.130 To this end, the court reasoned that the property 
owner was unjustly being forced to bear the burden, individually, of 
enhancing the quality of life for the public as a whole.13l 
In addition to its holding, the court implied that in a takings case, 
the focus of the "intrusiveness" analysis should be on the value of the 
property taken away by the restriction, rather than on the remaining 
value of the property as was held in Penn Central.132 Despite the 
similarities between the Fifth Amendment of the United States Con-
stitution and the applicable provision of the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion, the court distinguished the Penn Central analysis on the ground 
that Pennsylvania, under its own Constitution, has never recognized 
either mere "aesthetics reasons or the stabilization of economic val-
ues" as valid exercises of the police power.133 
Justice Cappy, along with Chief Justice Nix and Justice McDer-
mott, concurred in the result, but on a much narrower basis. l34 In 
Justice Cappy's opinion, the court did not need to reach the takings 
issue since it was clear that the Commission had no authority to 
128 See id. at 11. 
129 [d. at 11 (emphasis added). 
130 [d. at 11-12. 
131 [d. 
132 [d. at 12-14. 
133 [d. at 12 (citing Redevelopment Auth. of Oil City v. Woodring, 445 A.2d 724, 727 (Pa. 1982)). 
134 See generally id. at 14 (Cappy, J., concurring). 
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regulate the interior of the theater, but rather, merely the exterior.135 
According to the plain meaning of the ordinance, Justice Cappy con-
cluded that any designation of the interior of the theater was clearly 
beyond the scope of the Commission's statutory authority and, thus, 
was invalid.136 Finally, Justice Cappy clearly disagreed with the ma-
jority's disregard for the Penn Central decision, noting that the lan-
guage of the two constitutional provisions was so similar that it was 
doubtful that Pennsylvania law would lead to a different result.137 
The majority opinion in United Artists' was an unexpected devel-
opment in American historical preservation law. Despite the major-
ity's attempt to distinguish Penn Central, its decision clearly contra-
dicted the Supreme Court's takings jurisprudence, a jurisprudence 
which had not been challenged in the fifteen years since Penn Central. 
This state challenge to the pronouncements of Penn Central, how-
ever, was short-lived. 
VI. UNITED ARTISTS' THEATER CIRCUIT, INC. V. CITY OF 
PHILADELPHIA II 
Following the decision in United Artists', the City of Philadelphia 
filed a petition pursuant to Rule 2543 of the Pennsylvania Rules of 
Appellate Procedure requesting the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to 
grant reargument.13S Such relief was granted on August 23,1991, and 
on October 23, 1991, the parties reargued the takings issue under the 
Pennsylvania Constitution.139 
On November 9, 1993, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed 
its earlier decision in the original United Artists' case, and in United 
Artists'II, concluded that under the Pennsylvania Constitution the 
designation of a building as historic without the consent of the owner 
was not a taking that required just compensation.140 This abrupt re-
versal by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court represented the end of 
any short-lived challenge to the ultimate authority of Penn Central 
on historic preservation taking challenges. 
At the outset of the United Artists' II opinion, the court acknow-
ledged the supreme authority of the Penn Central decision in federal 
takings jurisprudence.141 The court noted that if the issue in United 
135 [d. at 14. 
136 [d. 
137 [d. 
138 United Artists' Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 635 A.2d 612, 614 (Pa. 1993). 
139 [d. 
140 [d. 
141 See id. 
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Artists' II had required an examination under the federal Constitu-
tion, the rationale of Penn Central would contro}.142 Putting that aside, 
the court then began an analysis of the Pennsylvania Constitution to 
determine whether its applicable provisions demanded the same re-
sult as would be arrived at under the federal Constitution or whether 
the rights of private property owners were "more expansive" under 
the Pennsylvania Constitution than under the federal Constitution.l43 
The court's analysis of whether the Pennsylvania Constitution af-
forded greater rights than the federal Constitution was based on a 
four-part test developed in a previous Pennsylvania case, Common-
wealth v. Edmunds,l44 consisting of the following factors: 1) an exami-
nation of the text of Pennsylvania's constitutional takings provision; 
2) an examination of the historical evolution of the court's interpreta-
tion of the provision, including the applicable takings case law; 3) an 
examination of related case law from other states; and 4) an examina-
tion of state and local policy considerations.145 In addition, the court 
noted that an examination of related federal precedent would be 
useful as a form of "guidance" to the state constitutional analysis.146 
A. Text 
In its analysis of the first factor, the court concluded that the text 
of Article I, Section 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution147 is virtually 
identical to that of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution for purposes of the court's analysis.148 The court had little 
trouble reaching this conclusion in light of the strikingly similar lan-
guage of the two provisions. 
B. History 
The court spent considerably more time in its analysis of the second 
factor, the history of the state constitutional provision.149 At the outset 
of its examination of the historical evolution of Pennsylvania takings 
law, the court noted that it had continually looked to federal precedent 
for guidance in its takings jurisprudence, and indeed had adopted the 
142 [d. at 615. 
143 See id. 
144 Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991). 
145 See United Artists', 635 A.2d at 615-16. 
146 [d. at 615. 
147 United Artists' Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 595 A.2d 6, 13-14 (Pa. 1991), 
rev'd, 635 A.2d 612 (Pa. 1993); PA. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
148 See United Artists', 635 A.2d at 615. 
149 See id. at 616-19. 
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analysis used in federal jurisprudence in several previous Pennsylva-
nia takings cases.1OO Specifically, the court enunciated the evolution of 
its analysis for determining whether a particular regulation of private 
property is "unduly oppressive" and thus in violation of the Pennsyl-
vania Constitution.1s1 According to the court, the test in these prior 
cases was taken in large part from the three-part analysis recited in 
Penn Central.152 
After deciding to follow precedent, the court stated that in order 
for a governmental action not to constitute a taking under the Penn-
sylvania Constitution, three conditions must be met: 
1) the interest of the general public, rather than a particular 
class of persons, must require governmental action; 
2) the means must be necessary to effectuate the purpose; 
3) the means must not be unduly oppressive upon the property 
holder, considering the economic impact of the regulation, and the 
extent to which the government physically intrudes upon the 
property.153 
The court then applied this three-prong takings analysis within its 
larger four-part examination of whether the historical designation 
was not a taking under the Pennsylvania Constitution even if it would 
be such under the federal Constitution. With regard to the first ele-
ment, the court noted that, by virtue of the city ordinance providing 
for historic preservation in Philadelphia, the citizens themselves em-
powered the government to act in areas of exclusively historic con-
cern for the purpose of preserving historic landmarks.l54 Thus, under 
the court's analysis, the "interest of the general public" prong of the 
test had clearly been satisfied. 
In its analysis of the second element, necessary means, the court 
found that it too was clearly satisfied. The court flatly rejected the 
argument that the government should purchase the historic proper-
ties rather than designate them as "historic" without compensation 
to the property owner.l56 The court emphasized the many disadvan-
tages of public ownershipl56 and concluded that historic preservation 
160 [d. at 616. 
151 [d. at 616-19. 
158 [d. at 617-18. The two-part test developed in Penn Central consists of an examination of: 
1) the economic impact of the regulation on the private property owner; and 2) the character 
and intrusiveness of the government action. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 
438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
158 United Artists', 635 A.2d at 618. 
164 [d. 
155 [d. 
156 See id. 
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legislation was the only "practical", and therefore the only necessary, 
means to accomplish the public interest in preserving historic land-
marks.157 
Finally, regarding the unduly oppressive element of the three-part 
takings analysis, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court attempted to ana-
lyze the economic impact of the regulation in question, as well as the 
degree of physical intrusion it required.158 From this analysis, the 
court concluded: 
[we do] not see the possibility that the owner is wholly deprived 
of any profitable use [citations omitted]. Nor do the parties allege 
that there is any physical intrusion on the property itself. Thus, 
the action not being "unduly oppressive," historic designation 
does not fulfill the elements for a "taking" requiring just compen-
sation.159 
Thus, in concluding that the designation of the theater satisfied all 
three prongs of the "non-taking" test, the court strongly implied that 
based on historical and precedential interpretations of the Pennsylva-
nia takings provision, the government's use of historic preservation 
legislation to protect historic landmarks was not foreclosed.160 
C. Case Law 
The court found that the third factor used by the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court in determining the applicability of the federal takings 
standard, an examination of related case law, favored the court's use 
of the Penn Central standard.161 In its brief analysis of this factor, the 
court found extremely persuasive the fact that no other state had 
broken with the Penn Central decision in the fifteen years since that 
decision.162 Thus, the court concluded, the widespread acceptance of 
the Penn Central decision as the standard for historic preservation 
takings cases weighed heavily against the Pennsylvania state courts' 
rejection of the Penn Central analysis for purposes of interpreting 
the Pennsylvania constitutional provisions, which is nearly identical 
to the relevant federal constitutional provision.163 
157Id. 
158 See id. at 618. 
159Id. at 618-19. 
160 See id. at 616-19. 
161 Id. at 619. 
162 Id. 
163 See id. at 619. 
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D. Policy 
Lastly, the court in United Artists' II analyzed the fourth factor 
of whether the Pennsylvania Constitution afforded private property 
owners greater protection of their rights than the federal Consti-
tution, state and local policy concerns.164 With regard to state policy, 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that Article I, Section 27 of 
the Pennsylvania Constitution, known as the "Environmental Rights 
Amendment,"165 clearly exhibits a strong state policy favoring the 
preservation of historic and aesthetic resources.166 The court further 
noted that historic preservation was clearly favored at the local level 
as well, in light of the declaration by the City of Philadelphia regard-
ing the preservation of historic resources.167 In short, both state and 
local policy, according to the court, strongly endorsed historic preser-
vation. 
E. The Holding 
At the conclusion of the above four-part analysis, the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania concluded that the similarity between the 
Fifth Amendment of the federal Constitution and Article I, Section 
10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution did not warrant a finding that the 
Pennsylvania Constitution afforded greater protection of property 
owners' rights than did the federal Constitution. The court flatly con-
cluded that "the designation of a privately owned building as historic 
without the consent of the owner is not a taking under the Constitu-
tion of this Commonwealth."168 As previously noted, this holding rep-
resented a complete and total reversal of the court's prior decision 
just two years earlier in United Artists' I. This decision put Pennsyl-
164 [d. at 619-20. 
165 Article I, Section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution reads: 
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the 
natural, scenic, historic and aesthetic values of the environment. Pennsylvania's public 
natural resources are the common property of all the people, including generations to 
come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain 
them for the benefit of all the people. 
P A. CONST. art. I, § 27. 
166 United Artists', 635 A.2d at 620. The court noted that the amendment was not self-execut-
ing and thus required legislative action, like the ordinance in question, for the amendment's 
purpose to be carried out. [d. 
167 PHILADELPHIA, PA. CODE § 14-2007(4)(a). "It is hereby declared as a matter of public 
policy that the preservation and protection of historic buildings, structures ... and districts of 
historic . . . and aesthetic merit are public necessities and are in the interest of the health, 
prosperity, and welfare of the people of Philadelphia." [d. 
168 United Artists', 635 A.2d at 620. 
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vania back in line with the United States Supreme Court's strong 
endorsement of the validity of historic preservation laws in Penn 
Central. 
Despite the detailed analysis of the takings issue, however, the Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania, in United Artists' II, ultimately rested 
its holding on its finding that the designation of the Boyd Theater was 
an illegitimate government activity. Specifically, the court found, in 
line with the concurring opinion in United Artists' I, that the Phila-
delphia Historical Commission had exceeded its authority under the 
preservation law by designating the interior of the theater as historic. 
Thus, the court concluded that the designation must be vacated.169 
In its analysis of the Commission's statutory authority, the court 
noted that there was no language in the statute which explicitly 
authorized the designation of the interior of the building as "histori-
cally or aesthetically significant."17o The only mention of the interior 
in the ordinance, the court stated, was in the section of the ordinance 
dealing with the property owner's duty of care in maintaining the 
designated building. l7l From this reading of the ordinance, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court concluded that "[the] plain meaning of this 
ordinance is that the interior must be maintained physically (and not 
aesthetically) for the express purpose of supporting the exterior of 
the building .... There is no 'clear and unmistakable' authority to 
designate the interior of a building. Therefore, the Commission pos-
sesses no such power."172 
The only possible authority for the Commission's alleged ability to 
regulate the interior of buildings would be if the interior supported 
the historically controlled exterior. Since the parties had not pre-
sented any evidence to the court regarding which portions of the 
theater's interior were used to support its exterior, the court vacated 
the entire designation order.173 Thus, having concluded that the His-
toric Commission exceeded its authority under the city ordinance, the 
169 [d. at 621-22. 
170 [d. at 621-22. The court specifically rejected a previous finding of the Commonwealth Court 
in Pennsylvania which concluded that the city council had clearly intended the word "building" 
in the ordinance to include both the interior and exterior areas. [d. at 622; see Sameric Corp. v. 
City of Philadelphia, 558 A.2d 155, 157 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989); see also Manwaring, supra note 
57, at 319-22 (arguing that there is, in effect, little difference between designation of interiors 
and exteriors of buildings because both designations are reasonable means of accomplishing 
legitimate historic preservation objectives and thus should be validated by the courts). 
171 United Artists', 635 A.2d at 622. The applicable section of the ordinance states, in part, that 
"[t]he exterior of every historic building ... shall be kept in good repair as shall the interior 
portions of the building." PHILADELPHIA, PA. CODE § 14-2007(8)(c). 
172 United Artists', 635 A.2d at 622. 
173 [d. 
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Pennsylvania Supreme Court was able to achieve two ends through 
its decision in United Artists' II: it was able to eliminate a historic 
designation which it clearly felt was unreasonably intrusive on a 
property owner's rights; and, simultaneously, it was able to place 
Pennsylvania takings jurisprudence back in line with Penn Central. 
VII. THE RISE TO TAKINGS IMMUNITY 
The decisions by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in United Art-
ists'I and United Artists' II demonstrate the proposition that since 
the Penn Central decision, historic preservation designations have 
become immune from successful constitutional takings challenges. As 
the law stands today, a property owner is essentially powerless to 
successfully challenge a historic designation as a taking. The only 
possible exception might be the application of Lucas to the unlikely 
circumstance that a designation renders a property completely value-
less. Notwithstanding this unlikely circumstance, however, so long as 
the Penn Central takings rationale remains the supreme law of the 
land in this area, this immunity will continue to survive.174 
A. Takings Immunity From Penn Central 
The aforementioned immunity from takings challenges stems di-
rectly from the three-part balancing test formulated by the Supreme 
Court in Penn Central.175 Under this test, it is difficult to see how any 
174 In Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994), decided June 24,1994, the Supreme Court 
held that the city's requirement that a landowner dedicate a portion of her property lying within 
a flood plain for improvement of the storm drainage system and dedicate property adjacent to 
the flood plain for a bicycle/pedestrian pathway as a condition for receiving a building permit 
allowing for expansion of the landowner's personal property did not satisfy the Fifth Amend-
ment's "reasonable relationship" requirement; that is, that the city had failed to show a "rea-
sonable relationship" between its requirements and the impact of the proposed development 
and, thus, that the imposition of such requirements amounted to a taking under the Fifth 
Amendment. [d. at 2319. The Court defined this newly created "reasonable relationship" test 
as requiring the city to "make some sort of individualized determination that the required 
dedication of the property [at] [issue] is related in both nature and extent to the impact of the 
proposed development" in order for such dedication to comply with the Fifth Amendment. [d. 
at 2319-20. 
The impact, if any, of this decision on the Penn Central takings' rationale in historic preser-
vation cases is unclear as of the date of this writing. Though one could argue that the decision 
suggests the likelihood of increased protection of the rights of private property owners by the 
Court in future takings cases, the precise effect on historic preservation takings jurisprudence, 
if any, can not be accurately measured until the next historic preservation takings case is decided 
by the Court. Until then, the Penn Central rationale remains the standard for historic preser-
vation takings cases. 
175 See supra text accompanying notes 95-107. 
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reasonablel76 historic designation could be found to be a taking in light 
of the strong bias in favor of the constitutionality of designations 
inherent in the Court's analysis. 
The first prong of the test, the economic impact on the property, 
focuses on that portion of the original property whose value has been 
destroyed as a result of the applicability of the particular ordinance. l77 
As was the case in Penn Central, the vast majority of historic desig-
nations are not going to destroy property value, but rather, may in 
fact either increase the value of a particular piece of property or may 
merely prevent a dramatic increase in its value. Thus, unless a desig-
nation effectively renders the property in question totally worthless, 
a court will find this first factor to favor the constitutionality of the 
designation. In short, the economic impact factor of the Penn Central 
balancing test clearly weighs heavily in favor of historic preservation 
designations. 
The second prong of the Penn Central test-whether the particular 
ordinance still permits the property owner to make reasonable use of 
his or her property-also clearly favors the constitutionality of his-
toric preservation designations.178 A historic designation is unlikely to 
deprive a private property owner of all reasonable uses of the prop-
erty. Indeed, the designation will probably not even affect the prop-
erty's current use, as was the case in Penn Central.179 Thus, in most 
cases, this second factor will weigh in favor of a private property 
owner's takings challenge. 
Finally, the character of the government action, the third prong of 
the Penn Central balancing test, arguably weighs most heavily in 
favor of the constitutionality of historic preservation designations. ISO 
Under this factor, the focus is on the justification for the particular 
ordinance, namely, whether or not the ordinance is designed to confer 
a broad public benefit. lSI Since Penn Central stands for the proposi-
tion, at least in part, that historic preservation is, in and of itself, 
specifically for the benefit of the public-at-Iarge, it is difficult to imag-
ine a situation in which a particular historic designation would be 
found not to have been made for the public benefit. In short, the third 
176 A "reasonable" historic designation would seem to include any designation which does not 
significantly or completely destroy the property's value. See Laitos, supra note 98, at 295. 
177 ld. 
178 See supra text accompanying notes 98-107. 
179 See Laitos, supra note 98, at 295. 
180 See id. 
181 See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. at 104, 124 (1978); Laitos, supra 
note 98, at 296. 
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factor of the Penn Central balancing test also favors the constitution-
ality of historic preservation designations. 
In addition, though it has not yet been applied to the historical 
preservation context, the Lucas rationale, which requires courts to 
find a taking where the applicability of a particular regulation renders 
the subject property valueless, has no real negative effect on the 
current immunity of preservation designations from takings chal-
lenges. As previously noted,182 the Lucas rationale would apply only 
to a historical preservation designation in which a property owner 
was able to demonstrate that his or her property was completely 
worthless due to the applicability of the regulation. Again, since this 
phenomenon is highly unlikely to occur in the historic preservation 
designation context, the Lucas rationale would seem to have little or 
no effect on the current state of immunity from takings challenges in 
American historical preservation jurisprudence. 
In sum then, what emerges from an analysis of the Penn Central 
three-part balancing test is the view that the analysis contains a 
strong inherent bias favoring the constitutionality of historic preser-
vation designations. This inherent bias, as clearly evidenced in the 
United Artists' II decision, has made it nearly impossible for a private 
property owner to successfully challenge a historic designation of his 
or her property as an unconstitutional taking. 
B. United Artists' I & II 
The unequivocal reversal of opinion by the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court in the United Artists' cases provides evidence of the propo-
sition that historical preservation laws have become immune from 
successful constitutional takings challenges since the United States 
Supreme Court's decision in Penn Central. In United Artists', the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court found a taking of private property un-
der the Pennsylvania Constitution through the use of a level of "in-
trusiveness" test.183 Put simply, the court concluded that the designa-
tion of the Boyd Theater, and all of the public obligations which 
accompany such designation, rose to an impermissible level of "intru-
siveness" and thus amounted to an unconstitutional taking.l84 How-
ever, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court soon realized that although 
the designation of the Boyd Theater "intruded" on a private property 
182 See supra text accompanying notes 113-14. 
183 See United Artists' Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 595 A.2d 6, 11 (Pa. 1991), 
rev'd, 635 A.2d 612 (Pa. 1993). 
184 See supra text accompanying notes 128--31. 
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owner's rights, mere intrusion was not sufficient to find an unconsti-
tutional taking under the mandates of Penn Central. Moreover, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court also recognized that the Pennsylvania 
Constitution did not warrant a result that afforded private property 
owners greater rights than did the federal Constitution in the same 
factual scenario. Thus, in United Artists' II, the court reached the 
opposite result. 
Not surprisingly, the test used by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
in United Artists' II to determine whether or not the designation was 
a taking under the Pennsylvania Constitution was strikingly similar 
to the test used in Penn Central.I85 As such, the United Artists' II 
test also contains an inherent bias favoring the constitutionality of 
historic designations. The adoption and use of this strongly biased 
takings analysis by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court provides com-
pelling evidence for the proposition that historic designations have 
become immune from successful constitutional takings challenges when 
they are analyzed under tests based on rationales similar to those in 
Penn Central. Moreover, due to similarity between the Fifth Amend-
ment and corresponding provisions in state constitutions, it is unlikely 
that a state court would adopt a historical preservation takings analy-
sis markedly different from the test adopted by the Supreme Court 
in Penn Central. 
The first prong of the Pennsylvania takings analysis adopted by the 
court in United Artists' II, focuses on the need for a general public 
interest to justify the government action. As was the case in Penn 
Central, it is unlikely that this factor would weigh against the consti-
tutionality of a historic designation. Both Penn CentraP86 and United 
Artists' II187 assert that such designations are generally for the pur-
pose of benefiting the public-at-large. Thus, it is hard to imagine a 
situation in which a historic designation would not satisfy the "public 
interest" prong of either the Penn Central or the United Artists' II 
analysis. 
The second prong of the Pennsylvania takings analysis-the means 
chosen must be necessary to effectuate the purpose-also weighs 
heavily in favor of the constitutionality of historic preservation desig-
nations. By concluding that historical designation was the only "prac-
tical" means and, therefore, the only necessary means, of accomplish-
185 Compare supra text accompanying notes 98--107 with text accompanying note 114. 
186 Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); Laitos, supra note 
98 at 296. 
187 United Artists' Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 635 A.2d 612, 618 (Pa. 1993). 
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ing the public interest in preserving landmarks, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court implied that historical designations will generally 
satisfy this second prong.188 
Finally, the third prong of the Pennsylvania takings analysis at-
tempts to analyze the economic impact of the regulation at issue, as 
well as the degree of physical intrusion it requires.189 As was the case 
in Penn Central, the United Artists' II court determined that the 
designation destroyed little or none of the Boyd Theater's property 
value and that any physical intrusion was minimaL 190 Since, as pre-
viously noted,191 any significant or total destruction of a property's 
value192 as a result of a historic designation is highly improbable, this 
third factor also weighs heavily in favor of the constitutionality of 
historic preservation designations. 
Thus, the above analysis of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's 
unequivocal reversal of opinion in United Artists' II reveals strong 
evidence for the general proposition that historic preservation desig-
nations have become immune from successful constitutional takings 
challenges since the Penn Central decision. Primarily, this evidence 
is derived from the fact that the United Artists' II court, like the 
Court in Penn Central, adopted a takings analysis heavily skewed in 
favor of the constitutionality of historic preservation designations. 
Furthermore, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's invalidation of 
the Commission's historical designation of the Boyd Theater as be-
yond the scope of the Commission's authority has no real effect on the 
proposition that historical designations have become immune from 
successful takings challenges. If, in fact, the ordinance in question had 
empowered the Commission to designate portions of the interior of 
structures as historical, under the court's three-part analysis, it is 
difficult to see how the property owner's takings challenge in United 
Artists'II could have been successfuL In short, under both the Penn 
Central and the United Artists' rationales, a successful takings liti-
gant, regardless of whether he or she is challenging an interior or 
exterior designation, still will have to satisfy a standard skewed heav-
ily in favor of the constitutionality of historic preservation designa-
tions. 
188 See id. at 618. 
189 See id. at 618-19. 
190 Id. 
191 See supra text accompanying notes 113; discussion supra part VII. 
192 The court noted that the designation of property as historic could constitute a taking "due 
to the extreme financial hardship resulting from such designation," but that "[nJo such facts had 
been presented in this case ... nor need the court decide here what level of financial hardship 
would meet this test." United Artists', 635 A.2d at 618 n.3. 
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For example, assuming that the Philadelphia ordinance in the United 
Artists' cases had allowed the Commission to designate portions of 
the interior of the Boyd Theater as historic, these designations would 
have survived a takings challenge under the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court's three-part test. First, under the general public interest prong 
of the analysis, there is no logical reason why the designation of an 
interior, as opposed to the exterior, of a structure would not be in the 
interest of the general public. Further, under the second prong of the 
test-the means chosen must be necessary to effectuate the purpose 
sought-the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's conclusion that historic 
designation is the only practical means available to accomplish the 
applicable public interest objectives sought clearly makes no distinc-
tion between the interiors and exteriors of structures. 
Finally, a designation of the interior of the theater would also 
satisfy the third prong of the court's analysis, the economic impact 
and extent of physical intrusion on the property. Though there would 
arguably be some degree of physical intrusion on the theater's inte-
rior, the economic impact of the designation would not be such as to 
deprive the property owner of all profitable uses of the theater.193 In 
this way, any designation of portions of the interior of the theater 
would not be found to be "unduly oppressive",194 and thus this third 
prong of the court's takings analysis also would favor the constitution-
ality of this type of historical designation. 
In short then, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's invalidation of the 
historic designation of the Boyd Theater arguably has no effect on the 
proposition that these designations have become immune from tak-
ings challenges since the Penn Central decision. The inherent bias 
favoring the constitutionality of historic preservation designations 
found in both the United Artists' II and Penn Central rationales does 
not distinguish between the interiors and exteriors of structures. 
Thus, whether challenging an interior or exterior designation, a suc-
cessful takings litigant still faces the nearly insurmountable task of 
satisfying a constitutional standard skewed heavily in favor of the 
validity of historic preservation designations. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Over the past fifteen years, the Supreme Court's ringing endorse-
ment of historic preservation goals in the Penn Central decision has 
remained essentially unchallenged. Not only did Penn Central con-
193 See id. at 618-19. 
194 Id. at 619. 
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clusively establish the constitutional validity of historic preservation 
legislation, it did so through the adoption of a takings standard which 
clearly favors the constitutionality of this type of legislation. The 
effect of the Court's adoption of this inherently biased standard for 
use in cases involving takings challenges to historical designations, as 
exhibited in the United Artists' cases, has been to prevent private 
individuals who own historically designated properties from success-
fully challenging the designations as takings under the applicable state 
or the federal Constitution. This "immunity" from successful takings 
challenges will undoubtedly continue to survive so long as the Penn 
Central rationale remains the supreme law of the land in this area. 
